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Increasingly, environmental problems are recognized to involve linkages across multiple 
environmental variables (Walker et al. 2004; Crepin 2007; Horan et al. 2011).  Examples include 
interactions between pollution and a fishery, between valuable indigenous and invasive species, 
and between land use and wildlife (or, more broadly, biodiversity).  Prior work on managing 
these complex, linked systems generally focuses on efficiency rather than implementation (e.g., 
Brock and Xepapadeas 2002; Crepin 2007).  However, implementation is important and also 
may be complex owing to the linkages across environmental variables.  Indeed, solutions to these 
complex environmental problems will generally involve changing human behaviors within the 
multiple economic sectors that impact upon the multiple environmental variables.   
In principle environmental management can be implemented in a variety of ways where 
the only required coordination across environmental sectors involves setting the policy tools at 
levels reflecting linkages within the complex environmental system.  For instance, when jointly 
managing pollution and an impacted fishery, one could use taxes on emissions and taxes on 
harvest landings.  The optimal tax rates would be calculated jointly and would optimally 
encourage individual polluters and anglers to consider their impacts upon the fishery.  However, 
these approaches do not encourage polluters to respond directly to angler behaviors, and vice 
versa.  This would not matter in a first-best setting where environmental managers can be certain 
to set the policy tools at levels to generate the correct response.  The same cannot be said for a 
real world (second-best) setting where managing human and environmental responses is 
imperfect.  In such a setting, there may be benefits from using policies that elicit responses to 
behavioral choices within the alternative sector.  The reason is that the value of environmental 2 
 
resources – and hence the value of the linkages being managed by environmental policies – 
depends on how agents are using the resources in each sector (Horan et al. 2011).   
Tradable permit markets are generally seen as a coordinating mechanism, within a 
particular regulated sector (e.g., a polluting sector), that enhances efficiency by incentivizing 
agents to respond to behavioral choices of others within the sector.  In a pollution permit market, 
for instance, increased emissions by one polluter must be offset by reductions in emissions from 
another polluter.  Polluters therefore respond to each other through the market, resulting in cost-
effective allocation of control among the sources.   
Economists have examined the creation of pollution permit markets that incorporate 
multiple pollutants (e.g., multi-pollutant markets, Montero 2001; or point-nonpoint trading, 
Shortle 1990) as a way of extending policy coordination to further improve the efficiency of 
pollution control.  In these markets, permits are defined for each pollutant type, and trading can 
occur across types using a trading ratio that defines how many permits for one pollutant can be 
traded for permits for the other pollutant.  However, prior work on permit markets stops short of 
coordinating behaviors across multiple sectors for cases where society benefits from regulation 
in both sectors and one sector harms the other.  For instance, permit markets are traditionally 
developed either for polluters or for a fishery, but not for both – even in cases where the fishery 
is damaged by pollution. 
This paper extends the concept of multiple permit types to a problem involving both the 
externality-generating sector and the affected sector.  This multi-sector market provides a 
mechanism for agents in one sector to respond to environmental behaviors made within the other 
sector.  Moreover, unlike traditional permit markets in which the regulated externality sector 
incurs only costs, we show that the multi-sector market generates efficiency gains that may be 3 
 
redistributed using appropriate allocations of initial endowments.  Accordingly, the multi-sector 
market may generate gains that benefit both sectors, resulting in a win-win outcome for both 
sectors.  We use a simple example of a polluted fishery to illustrate the approach, but note that it 
could be applied in a variety of different settings. 
 
Polluted Fishery 
Suppose a commercial fishery is polluted by emissions from local industry.  Denote the fish 
stock by x and the stock of ambient pollution affecting the fishery by a.  The fish stock grows 
according to: 
(1)  h a x g x − = ) , ( &  
where g is net growth prior to harvesting, and h is the aggregate harvest.  For a given a, g takes 
the usual shape with respect to x:  0 < xx g  (where subscripts denote partial derivatives), and 
g(0,a)=g(X(a),a)=0, where X(a) is the carrying capacity of the fishery for a given value of a.  We 
assume pollution reduces both total and marginal growth of the fishery ( 0 ) , ( < a x ga ,
0 ) , ( < a x gxa ), which yields Xa(a) < 0.  The reduction in fishery productivity is the only way in 
which pollution damages the fishery in the model (e.g., the value of fishery harvests are not 
reduced due to pollution, though we could model this).  
  The stock of ambient pollution grows according to 
(2)  a z a γ − = &  
where z is current emissions and γ is the decay rate of pollution in the fishery.  We have specified 
a linear relation in (2) for simplicity, but more generally the relation could be nonlinear.  4 
 
Damages other than those to the fishery are given by the increasing, convex damage cost 
function D(a). 
 
The Social Optimum 
We illustrate the multi-sector trading approach by focusing on a first-best setting.  Though the 
real power of trading likely comes from second-best settings, the first-best approach is simpler to 
present and is easily expanded to second-best settings.   
For simplicity, polluting firms and anglers are all price takers operating in a competitive 
setting, with neither sector being large enough to affect input or output prices.  These 
assumptions imply that it is equivalent to focus on aggregate choices and welfare measures, as 
opposed to the choices and welfare of individual firms.  We focus on aggregate measures, for 
now, to simplify the analysis.  Implicitly (for now, explicitly later), we assume the number of 
firms and anglers is fixed, so that the optimal choices are derived for fixed industry structures.  
This is not a necessary assumption, but again it simplifies the exposition. 
Denote polluters’ net benefits of generating emissions in a particular period by the 
concave function π(z).  Denote anglers’ net benefits of harvesting in a particular period by the 
concave function B(h,x), where  0 ) , ( > x h Bx  to reflect the fact that net benefits generally 
increase when the resource stock is larger (as harvest costs are smaller when fish are abundant).  
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The current value Hamiltonian associated with this problem is 5 
 
(4)  [] [ ] a e h a x g x h B z H γ − η + − λ + + π = ) , ( ) , ( ) (  
where λ>0 is the co-state associated with x and η<0 is the co-state associated with a.  The 
necessary conditions for this problem are (1)-(2) along with 
(5)  0 ) , ( = − =
∂
∂











(7)  ) , ( ) , ( a x g x h B x x λ ρλ λ − − = &   
(8)  ηγ λ ρη η + − + = ) , ( ) ( a x g a D a a &  
The solution to conditions (5)-(8), described at length by Tahvonen (1991), can be written in 
feedback form as  ) , (
* a x h , ) , (
* a x z ,  ) , (
* a x λ , and  ) , (
* a x η .  
 
Multi-Sector Permit Trading 
Though a decentralized market consists of interactions involving many firms, we continue to 
simplify the exposition by focusing on the two aggregate sectors.  We begin by specifying how 
decisions are made prior to regulation.  Unregulated polluters choose the emissions level 
0 z  such 
that  0 ) (
0 = π z z , yielding  0 ) (
0 0 > π = π z .  Unregulated anglers choose the harvest volume 
) (
0 x h  such that rents are competed away  0 ) ), ( (
0 = x x h B .  
Now consider the design of the decentralized multi-sector permit market.  This market is 
based on a single category of permits to be allocated between the two sectors.  Without loss of 
generality, permits are denominated in terms of emissions.  Permits are denoted z ˆ and are sold at 
a price of q.  A cross-category trading ratio, denoted τ, defines how many harvest permits count 6 
 
for one emissions permit.  This ratio ensures that an increase in ecological pressure from one 
sector is accompanied by a decrease in ecological pressure from the other sector.  For instance, 
fishing firms (anglers, indexed by f) holding 
f z ˆ  permits are allowed to harvest 
f z ˆ τ fish.  Anglers 
can only increase their aggregate harvests, increasing stress to the fishery, by removing 1/τ 
emissions from the system and offsetting some degree of stress on the fishery.  In purchasing 
these permits, it is as if anglers are making an investment in pollution control.  Alternatively, 
polluters can only increase their aggregate emissions if they purchase permits from the fishery.  
In purchasing these permits, it is as if polluters are making an investment in conserving the 
fishery. 
Consider the problem faced by polluters (indexed by p), who are initially allocated 
0 ˆ
p z  
permits.  Polluters will choose emissions levels, z, and emissions permit holdings, 
p z ˆ , to 
maximize their net benefits of emissions,  ] ˆ ˆ [ ) (
0 p p z z q z − − π = Π , given that their total emissions 
cannot be greater than their permit holdings, 
p z z ˆ ≤ .  Assuming the emissions constraint is 
satisfied as an equality, then 
p z ˆ  can be eliminated as a choice variable so that 
] ˆ [ ) (
0 p z z q z − − π = Π .  The resulting first order condition is 
(9)  0 ) ( / = − π = ∂ Π ∂ q z z z . 
  Now consider the problem faced by anglers, who are initially allocated 
0 ˆ
f z  permits.  
Anglers will choose harvest levels, h, and permit holdings, 
f z ˆ , to maximize their net benefits of 
harvesting,  ] ˆ ˆ [ ) , (
0 f f z z q x h B − − , given that their total harvests cannot be greater than their 
permit holdings, 
f z h ˆ τ ≤ .  Assuming the harvest constraint is satisfied as an equality, then 
f z ˆ  7 
 
can be eliminated as a choice variable so that anglers’ net benefits can be written as 
] ˆ / [ ) , (
0 f z h q x h B − τ − .  Anglers’ necessary condition for optimal harvests is 
(10)   0 / = τ − q Bh  
The market solution is characterized by the necessary conditions (9) and (10) along with the 
market clearing condition 
(11)   h z z z
f p ) / 1 ( ˆ ˆ
0 0 τ + ≥ +  
In particular, conditions (9) and (10) together imply that the market equilibrium results in 
indifference at the margin between using permits for emissions or harvests, with the technical 
rate of permit substitution being equal to the economic rate of substitution:  
(12) ) , ( / ) ( x h B z h z π = τ .   
  
The Economically Optimal Multi-Sector Permit Market 
An optimal permit market is designed by choosing the aggregate number of permits (in either 
denomination) and the trading ratio to maximize the present value of social net benefits, subject 
to polluters’ and anglers’ behaviors in the market as given by conditions (9)-(11).  As market 
behaviors do not constrain a first-best trading program, we can derive the first-best program by 
simply analyzing how the solution to the planner’s problem (3) relates to the market solution.  
First consider the optimal choice of trading ratio.  Comparing condition (9) with 
condition (6), we see that an optimally designed market will yield  ) , ( ) , (
* * a x a x q η = .  
Conditions (5) and (12) then imply the optimal state-dependent trading ratio is 
(13)  0 ) , ( / ) , ( ) , (
* * * > − = a x a x a x λ η τ ,  
The trading ratio, which defines how a harvest volume substitutes for one emissions permit, is 8 
 
larger the larger are the marginal damages of pollution (-η) relative to the marginal value of the 
fishery (λ).  Greater reductions in harvests are required to increase emissions the larger are 
marginal damages, ceteris paribus, implying emissions increases are costly in this setting.  Fewer 
reductions in harvests are required to increase emissions the larger is the marginal value of the 
fishery, ceteris paribus, implying emissions increases are cheap in this setting.     
  Alternatively, more emissions permits must be removed from the system to increase 
harvests, the larger is the marginal value of the fishery, ceteris paribus, implying harvest 
increases are expensive in this setting.  The reason is that more harvests would depress resource 
rents and reduce the value of the fishery.  Fewer emissions permits must be removed to increase 
harvests, the larger are marginal damages, ceteris paribus, implying harvest increases are cheap 
in this setting.  The reason is that the fishery has incentives to take more emissions permits off 
the market, to reduce pollution, when pollution is heavily damaging to the fishery and/or society 
at large. 
  The adjoint condition (8) can be used to rewrite the optimal trading ratio as  
(14)  0
] )[ ), , ( (
) (
] )[ ), , ( (
/ )) , ( ( ) , (
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The first right-hand-side (RHS) term, which is positive, is the discounted marginal impact of 
pollution on fishery growth, where the discount rate is ρ+γ to reflect the persistence of pollution.  
The second RHS term is the discounted capital gain associated with pollution, normalized by the 
marginal value of fish. This second term vanishes in the steady state.  The final RHS term is the 
discounted marginal damage costs accruing outside the fishery, again normalized by the 
marginal value of fish.  The larger are marginal damages outside of the fishery, the larger the 
trading ratio and hence the price of emissions permits relative to harvest permits. 9 
 
  Now consider the optimal number of permits.  Denote the total number of permits by Z
*.  
The optimal state-dependent number of permits is then specified as  
(15)  ( ) ) , ( ) , ( / 1 ) , ( ) , (
* * * * a x h a x a x z a x Z τ + =  
We now turn to the issue of allocating these permits.   
 
Choosing the initial permit allocation: creating a win-win solution 
Once the trading ratio and the number of permits are chosen, the permit market is implemented 
by choosing a method to allocate permits among polluting firms and anglers.  We analyze an 
approach in which the permits are freely allocated (as opposed to auctioned off).  In this setting, 
the regulatory authority chooses some combination of 
* 0 ˆ
p z  and 
* 0 ˆ
f z  such that the aggregate 
permit cap is attained in each period.  Specifically, if we specify the initial allocation in state-
dependent form, then the allocation in each period must satisfy the following relation  
(16)  ) , ( ) , ( ˆ ) , ( ˆ
* * 0 * 0 a x Z a x z a x z
f p = +  
  It is well-known that the initial allocation of permits does not affect market efficiency, 
provided transactions costs are negligible and markets are competitive (Montgomery 1972).  The 
initial allocation of permits does affect the ex post (i.e., post trading) distribution of welfare, 
however, as firms initially allocated with permits will be better off than firms that do not hold 
permits initially but must instead purchase them from the initial permit holders.  The initial 
allocation is typically approached as an equity issue (Kampas and White 2003).
1  However, we 
argue that the allocation could have welfare implications, making it also an efficiency issue. 
  In a traditional pollution permit market where pollution-related costs are external to all 
                                                            
1 The initial allocation has been shown to have efficiency implications when there are transactions costs (Stavins 
1995). 10 
 
permit market participants, all economic surplus created by the permit market accrue to non-
polluters whereas economic costs arise as the net impact to polluters in the permit market.  
Polluters endowed with a relative abundance of initial permit holdings may gain from the 
pollution market, as they can sell some of their permits to others.  However, these gains only 
result from an income transfer that does not affect economic surplus among polluters; as 
indicated above, polluters are collectively worse off after the imposition of the permit market and 
the initial endowment only redistributes these costs. Indeed, Kampas and White (2003) analyze a 
variety of allocation approaches for a traditional pollution permit market and find that the gains 
to one sub-group of permit traders is always offset by losses to another sub-group.   
  The multi-sector permit market described here differs from traditional permit markets in 
that the multi-sector market generates economic surplus for the fishery.  Absent other external 
damage costs (i.e., if D(a) = 0), or when these other damage costs are sufficiently small, the 
gains to the fishery must outweigh abatement costs in a first-best market.  Moreover, the proper 
redistribution of this additional surplus could leave all market participants better off than if the 
permit market had not been implemented, so that the permit market yields a win-win outcome.  
In what follows, we simplify matters by assuming D(a) = 0. 
  The redistribution of additional surplus that is required for a win-win outcome may be 
accomplished via the choice of initial permit endowments, provided such a redistribution lies in 
the core.  A minimum condition for such a redistribution to lie in the core is that both polluters 
and anglers can be better off when all permits are initially allocated to polluters.  The reason is 
that all economic surplus is generated by the fishery, and so a win-win outcome will only arise if 
surplus in excess of polluting firms’ abatement costs can be transferred to the pollution sector. 
Assuming polluters receive all permits initially, they will be better off than in the unregulated 11 
 
scenario whenever the following condition holds: 









∫ ∫ dt e y x z dt e a x a x h a x q
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The RHS of (17) represents the present value of abatement costs.  The left hand side (LHS) of 
(17) represents the present value of total revenue that polluters receive from selling permits to 
anglers.  Note that anglers are collectively always better off under the permit market, even if all 
permits are initially allocated to polluters.  Anglers’ permit purchases in this case, as given by the 
RHS of (17), equal  ) , ( ) ), , ( (
* * a x h x a x h Bh  after using condition (10).  Anglers’ post regulatory 
net benefits are then  ) , ( ) ), , ( ( ) ), , ( (
* * * a x h x a x h B x a x h B h − , which is positive by the concavity of 
B.  Finally, note that condition (17) implies  
(18)  [] dt e y x z dt e x a x h B
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which must hold in a first-best outcome in which the surplus gained by the fishery exceeds 
abatement costs.  Hence a win-win situation is not inconsistent with a first-best outcome. 
 
Allocations based on Shapley values 
Assuming (17) holds, a win-win outcome is possible.  Though many initial allocations may result 
in a win-win outcome, a particularly interesting allocation is based on Shapley values.  Shapley 
values describe how surplus can be redistributed among all participants in such a way that the 
participants would voluntarily choose to participate in the regulatory program (Shapley 1972; 
Petrosjan and Zaccour 2003).  That is, using Shapley values to allocate surplus results in the 
permit market also being a cooperative solution: all participants would choose to participate in 
the permit market if given a choice between participation and going unregulated.  Such an 12 
 
outcome is neither a requirement of a permit market nor of a win-win outcome.  But, as we 
describe below, this outcome does lead to a desirable, and perhaps efficiency-enhancing, 
property. 
  Shapley values have a dynamic interpretation in the current context, and so we use the 
dynamic approach developed by Petrosjan and Zaccour (2003) to derive these values.  It now 
becomes necessary to consider individual firms and anglers.  Index individuals by i∈(1,I), with 
polluting firms taking index values i∈(1,p) and anglers taking index values i∈(p+1,I).  
Individual polluters’ emissions are denoted 
i z , with  ∑
∈
=
) , 1 ( p i
i z z .  In particular, denote 
0 i z  to be 
the unregulated emissions level for firm i, with  ) (
0 i i z π  being the corresponding profit level.  
Individual anglers’ harvests are denoted 
i h , with  ∑
+ ∈
=
) , 1 ( I p i
i h h .  Denote  ) (
0 x h
i  to be the 
unregulated harvest level for angler i, with  ) ), ( (
0 x x h B
i i  being the corresponding profit level.  
Taking others’ choices as given, the present value of net benefits to individual i at time t is 
(19)    
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The value functions F
i are expressed in terms of both the current state and the current time, as 
Petrosjan and Zaccour (2003) indicate it is necessary to keep track of all these variables to ensure 
the derivation of a dynamically consistent allocation of economic surplus.  We can also define 
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where  ) (t x
I  and  ) (t a
I  are the values of the states at time t when an efficient solution has been 
followed from the initial period until time t.  That is, these values represent the solution to (3), 
evaluated at time t, or equivalently are the solution to problem (20) for the special case of the 
grand coalition K=I.  Given these definitions, the characteristic function of the cooperative game 
is: 
(21) 
I K t a x K F t a x K v
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The Shapley value is then 
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where k is the number of members of coalition K.  The Shapley value represents the present 





i t a x I F t a x v ) , , , ( ) , , , ( .  Unlike static models, the dynamic Shapley value in (22) is not the 
current allocation of surplus to individual i.  Rather, the amount of economic surplus to be 
allocated to individual i at time t is based on the dynamic Shapley value: 
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The Bellman’s equation associated with problem (20) for the case of the grand coalition, which 
holds along an efficient solution path, is  
(25) 
dt
t a x I dF
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Rearranging (25) and comparing the result with (24), we find the following relation must hold 
(26)  ∑ ∑ ∑
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Hence, current-period surplus is fully allocated in each period.   
The surplus allocation indicated by (23) is achieved by setting the following initial permit 
allocations at time t 
(27) 
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where the first equality comes from (27), the second equality comes from rearranging the RHS 
terms, and the third equality comes from applying the relations in (26) and (15). 
  Given the initial permit levels in (27), firms and anglers would cooperatively participate 
in the permit market even if the market was not formally regulated.  This has potentially 
important efficiency implications.  Traditional permit markets are deemed beneficial because, 
even with an inefficiently large permit cap, i.e., Z>Z
*, the solution is still cost-effective.  Here, 
having an inefficient permit cap results in less surplus to be distributed, leaving market 
participants worse off than in the efficient outcome.  Accordingly, when aggregate permit levels 
are suboptimal, all market participants will have a private incentive to coordinate on requesting 
additional regulation, i.e., a lower Z, so as to move to the efficient intertemporal allocation.  
Thus, there is private inertia for more efficient regulation. 
 
Discussion 
We have shown that it is possible to develop and implement environmental markets to link 
sectors that interact ecologically, but which have not previously interacted economically.  Such 
markets lead agents in each sector to both affect and respond to behaviors and ecological 16 
 
changes in the other sector, extending and enhancing economic feedbacks in ways that can 
improve efficiency.  While our focus was on a first-best multi-sector market, for which there 
would be no efficiency gains relative to first-best traditional (single-sector) markets, the real 
power of the approach likely comes in second-best settings.  Indeed, second-best single-sector 
markets are likely to be less responsive to ecological and behavioral changes than second-best 
multi-sector markets in which economic signals about environmental pressures and ecological 
health are transmitted across sectors.   
  An added benefit of multi-sector markets, which arises even in the first-best case, is the 
possibility of a win-win outcome in which both sectors gain from regulation.  This is not true of 
single-sector markets, in which the externality-generating sector only incurs costs while the gains 
in economic surplus are external to this sector.  The multi-market approach internalizes these 
gains and, via the initial permit allocation, can reallocate these gains to the various market 
participants.  Indeed, we have shown that it is possible to create a market in which all 
participants would voluntarily choose to be regulated at efficient levels.  If regulations are too 
lax, all participants would have incentives to demand more!   
 
  17 
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